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Abstract 
In recent years, a significant increasing in development of Wireless networks is noticed; they become an entire part of the 
Internet and demonstrate effectiveness in handling communication for reduced public LAN and military applications. This is 
mainly due to their mobility and low cost solutions; nevertheless, they are also prone to several attacks related to data integrity, 
Deni of Service and eavesdropping. This paper discusses wireless security protocols, their limitations and weakness. We present 
also an overview of the FMS (Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir), a recovery key attack and demonstrate its effectiveness in reducing the 
average number of intercept packets based on a well choice of IV (initialization vectors). Some comparative experiments on 
ciphertext-only attacks were performed in order to study the efficiency of such technique and underline encountered difficulties. 
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1. Introduction 
Actually, wireless networks become an essential tool of communication due to their flexibility, effectiveness and 
low cost [1]. On another side, wireless networks have many constraints in regard to traditional networks such as 
reduced storage data and low-power consumption. In addition, wireless networks broadcast data by using radio 
waves which are usually sensitive to eavesdropping; it is although necessary to keep the data transmitted through 
network nodes permanently encrypted in order to prevent unauthorized parts to gain access to its content. In 
Wireless networks, communication management is handled by WEP, WPA and WPA2 protocols designed for 
protecting communications. However and, in regard to their limitations, security solutions intended for such 
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networks become insufficient against attacks on secret keys. The aim of this study is to outlines the security related 
issues in wireless networks; We focuses on WEP and WPA protocols, which still widely used but also appears 
unable to provide security against various threats and vulnerabilities like FMS attack which is based on the 
Initialization vector (IV) weakness and needs about 4 million of packets to recover the secret key. Our contribution 
is to locate the best way in choice of IV in order to reduce the average number of intercept packets necessary to 
recover the secret key. This fact decreases eavesdropping access time when using passive-attacks. So, after an 
introduction, the paper presents a briefly review of existent wireless protocols, their specificities and flaws in 
sections 2; Section 3 presents a background on previous works related to threats and attacks. We focuses on FMS 
attack performance in section 4, followed by some comparative experiments based on statistical analysis of amount 
of traffic intercepted in order to reveal secret keys, followed up with discussion of results and conclusion. 
2. Wi-Fi protocols 
The IEEE standard 802.11 based wirelesses allow connecting laptops, desktops, PDAs or any device with 
broadband connection over an area of several hundred meters in an open environment.  The Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP) [2], a part of the IEEE Standard 802.11 is created in 1999 and widely implemented on WLAN 
devices; it designed to provide privacy, authentication and integrity similar to wired networks. WEP is based on the 
RC4 encryption scheme [3] and the CRC-32 for data integrity and uses a shard secret key k of 5 to 13 bytes.   
In order to produce a ciphertext C and its checksum ICV from a plaintext M, the key k is combined with an 
initialization vector IV of 3 bytes according to the following formula (1):  
 
C=M||ICV(M) ⊕ RC4(K)||IV                                                                                                                                  (1) 
 
where || denotes a concatenation operator and ⊕, the bitwise exclusive OR operator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. WEP Encapsulation process. [26] 
The IV is the keystone of WEP security; it’s incremented for each emitted packet in order that two subsequent 
packets cannot be encrypted with the same key. This presumes maintaining a decent level of security and preventing 
information leakage. The WEP was designed as a first tool of Wi-Fi networks security. 
WEP is intended to be relatively efficient [4] and implementable in both hardware and software. Also, emitted 
packets are encrypted separately without dependence of each other which avoid resynchronization on packet loss 
[5].  
The Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) is an improved version of standard 802.11i developed by Wi-Fi-Aliance in 
2001. It’s based on Temporary Key integrity Protocol (TKIP), a robust encryption algorithm built around WEP; it 
allows a random key generation which disables attacks based on statistical analysis. WPA includes some improved 
properties such Message integrity code (MIC) [6] and key hash function [7] to avoid IV attacks.  Figure 2 illustrates 
a WPA-TKIP process where TK, DA, SA denotes resp. the temporary key, the sender and destination addresses and 
||, the concatenation operator. 
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RC4 WEP Key IV Plaintext CRC-32 
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Fig. 2. WPA Encapsulation process [8] 
 
WPA2 is the certified successor of WPA, is built on the Counter-Mode protocol (CCMP) based on the Advanced 
Encryption Standard algorithm (AES). It employs a 128 bit-key length with 48-bit IV which provides more data 
protection and access control; it also decreases vulnerability to replay attacks and offers enhanced security compared 
with TKIP. The WPA2 remains the strongest form of Wi-Fi encryption and authentication currently available.  
3. Wi-Fi protocols security overview 
The data confidentiality and integrity is the most important challenge in wireless networks security, especially 
when exchanging sensitive information on industrial, military applications or key identity distribution. The WEP 
security is based on the Rivest Cipher 4 structure (RC4), a stream cipher algorithm where the plaintext is X-ored 
with a sequence of random bytes generated by key scheduling algorithm (KSA) and Pseudo-Random Generation 
Algorithm (PRGA), parts of RC4, however, it is proved that these bytes aren’t really random as they should be; they 
are built upon a 64 bit-key length, but really 40 bits are fixed. The remaining 24 bits of IV offers just 16 million 
possibilities and, statistically gives a 50% chance of reuse of IV after less than 5000 packets; however, it may be 
vulnerable to paradox birthday attack. In addition, WEP employs a single key shared between all nodes and access 
points and is not often changed. Based upon these weakness, WEP is vulnerable to several key types of attacks such 
DoS attacks, node takeovers, traffic analysis, etc. Borison et al. [9] presented some flaws in the WEP related to RC4 
structure which consists of initializing of the IV and increment them by one for every use. And since, the key space 
is reduced which allows a high chance that keystreams will be reused; The IV weakness has also been revealed by 
Fluhrer et al. [10] by using the FMS attack; the idea was to identify weak-keys which can be used to determine a set 
of output bits; results showed that 4 million packets are sufficient to recover secret key. The same attack requires 
more than 5 million packets to recover secret key in another implementation realized by [11] [12]. Similar to FMS 
attack, the Korek attack [13] tries to reveal beginning key-bits from the data blocks generated by PRGA algorithm; 
Results were obtained by brute force on a set of 1 million keys. Several other attacks such as Klein attack [14], PTW 
attack [15] allowed to reveal the secret key with 30 to 60 thousand packets. VV attack [16] uses random IV’s; 
Results showed that a 32 thousands packets are sufficient to recover the secret key. These results were reduced to 24 
thousands by Beck et al. [17] 
 
By using different key for each encrypted packet, successfully attacks on protocols WPA and WPA2 seems rare 
and harder in practice. Attacks based DoS [27] where frequently used, they attempt saturating target machine with 
external traffic in order to slow down it;  the attacks force the system to reset; consequently, it becomes unable to 
identify legitimate requests. Also, the hole196 [18] is a popular attack, it aims especially the GTK, a shared key for 
all network devices, used for broadcast traffic which cannot detect address spoofing and data forgery. This key 
allow to a user within the network to carry out an attack such as DoS or DNS Spoofing by injecting traffic from one 
access point to other machines associated to the same access point. This act promote victim machines to forward 
traffic intended to the access point. The attacker is so, able to eavesdrop all unencrypted packets without being 
detected by the access point. Similar, other attacks were also performed on TKIP, the BT attack [19] consist to 
perform minor changes on ARP and DNS short packet in order to recover plaintext and keystream of packets and in 
turn, proceed to DoS and ARP poisoning attacks. The BT attack was improved by Ohigashi-Morii attack [20] [21] 
TK 
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which combined with the man-in-the-middle attack in order to reduce execution time.  
Table 1 illustrates the most popular attacks on WEP and WPA protocols where the secret key is revealed by the 
amount of packets mentioned. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of most popular secret key recovery attacks 
 
 
Protocol Attack Type IV-search Year Packets (million) 
       
 
WEP FMS [10] Statistical Random 2001 4-6 
  
Korek  [13] 
 
Random 2004 0.1 
  
 
 
Brute-force 
 
0.001-1 
  
 
    
  
PTW [15] 
 
Random 2007 0.04 
    
Brute-force 
 
1 
       
  
VV [16] 
 
Random 2007 0.32 
  
Klein [14] Key-recovery Random 2008 0.25-0.6 
  
BT [17] 
 
Aircraft-ng 2009 0.24 
 
WPA Dictionary attack Key-recovery 
   
  
Beck and Tews [19] QoS 
 
2009 
 
  
Ohigashi-Morii [20] Inject packets 
 
2009 
 
  
Hole196 [18] Man-in-the-middle 
 
2010 
 
       
 
  
4. FMS attack overview 
The secret key k and the initialization vector IV constitute the major weakness of WEP protocol; only the 3 bytes 
of IV changes for each transmitted packet while the 13 bytes of k still static. These flaws are exploited by the most 
attacks against keystreams. 
The FMS, a known plaintext attack, requires knowing the first byte of the keystream and needs a large number of 
initialization vectors to have enough of weak IV, necessary for the attack success. The FMS is based upon two 
conditions [10]: 
a. At iteration i of KSA, if we reached a stage where x=Si[1], y=Si[x],x+y= Si[x]+ Si[ Si[y]] with 1ixx+y; 
then, a probability of 5% that none of elements x, y and x+z would be used in subsequent iterations and 
S[x]+S[S[1]] may be the first byte generated by PRGA. This situation is called resolved state.  
b. In a resolved state, [22] shows that the value of the next key-byte b of key k has a 5% probability to be as 
ܵሺܾሻ ൌ ܵ௕ାଶିଵ ሾܱݑݐሿ െ ݆௕ାଶ െ ܵ௕ାଶሾܾ ൅ ͵ሿ  if S[1]<I and S[x]+S[S[1]]=I+b where Out is the first output 
of PRGA; I, the IV length and S, S
-1 are state vectors of KSA for first b iterations. 
In application of WEP, we assume that we know the first a bytes of secret key k[3],..,k[a+2]. Initially, we have 
a=0, so, just the 3 bytes of IV are known.  
Upon these considerations, the FMS tries to simulate the first x iterations of the KSA which allows determining 
the permutation Sx-1 and related indices ix-1 and jx-1. The next value of i is also known (ix=x) but the next value of j 
depends on the next key byte selected. A random key byte has only 5% of chance to be correct; so, it’s possible to 
determine the next key-byte among several candidate bytes upon their apparition, extracts from a large number of 
packets. This principle can come up in selection on all next bytes of key. 
As it indicates, the success of such idea depends on a weak-IV. A weak IV allows to reveal information on key-
bytes, it has a specific form (a+3, 255, x) where a, denotes the k-byte to be found and x is irrelevant. This form is 
denoted by a high correlation between IVs and PRGA output [23]. Since IVs are plain, weak-IV are easy to detect. 
Another variant of a Weak-IV, called key-independent weak IVs proposed by [24] with lead to t=S3[1]+ S3[ S3[1]] 
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and used to guess k[t] where 3t. Also, Fluhrer & al. [10] proposed another way of IV selection: the key-dependent 
weak IVs leads to SI[1]< I and SI[x]+ SI[SI[1]]=I+b where I, the IV size (=3) and a, the guessed a-th  key-byte. 
5. Experimental study 
In this section, we report an implementation of FMS attack on WEP protocols. The aim of experiment is to verify 
the efficiency of such attack on real Wi-Fi environment, its cost and if possible to contribute to its improvement.    
Experiments were conducted on 3.2 GHz CPU; the environment includes the aircrack-ng suite [25] on Linux 
system; we need also to set wireless card in monitor mode. To capture data, we uses airdump-ng tool switched to 
target specific AP packets from a single channel. We used a compatible network interface which allows the 
generation and injection de packets in order to increase traffic. The IVs captured were split into three files according 
to their specificities: specific form IV, key-dependent weak IV and key-independent weak IV. Also, all IV captured 
were stored into another file which used for exhaustive search test.  Finally, we proceed to attack, which seems 
sample: for each key-byte, we selects an IV file, each IV is concatenate with the secret key and proceed to the first 
three iterations of KSA algorithm. Then, we may seek for each key-byte that verified a resolved condition by using 
aircrack-ng. The bar chart in following figure gives the variation of CPU time with each category of IV. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Variation of CPU time with IV selection form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Variation of traffic used with IV selection form 
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It’s noticeable that the key-independent weak-IV outperforms the other forms. Also, the brute force needs much 
longer time to improve its performance especially on 104 bits key long. Also, it turns out that and, in the same 
environment, the key-independent weak-IV outperforms significantly better in most cases. Overall, the FMS attack 
has proved its effectiveness for attack of WEP.  
Overall, our contribution, with less than 0.2 million of packets and compared with the results reported in Table 2, 
seems an improved way in reducing significantly the data size necessary to the success of FMS attack. However, 
current research in wireless cryptanalysis leans toward WPA and WPA2 attacks which remains ineffective until 
today. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of most popular alternatives of FMS attack 
 
FMS attack 
Amount of packets 
(million) 
Success 
prob. 
Fluhrer et al. [10] 4-6 
100 Stubblefield et al. [11] 1-2 
Hilton [27] 1 
Tews et al [15] 0.7 50 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Wi-Fi protocols claims providing security solution such as wired networks; they are still of interest until today. 
However, such protocols are not fully secure and can be target of key recovery attacks in a real world. 
 
In this paper we shed some light on the behaviour of protocol attacks and demonstrate that they seem harder in 
practice than in theory and their success probability has often been miscalculated and depend on test environment 
which differs according to each contribution. Results in literature cannot be reproduced due to lack of environment 
details such packets features and implementation setting which seems to be taken heuristically. 
 
Our experiments show that FMS is not a complete key recovery attack, but can be improved by a well way of 
collecting packets; so, the key-independent weak-IV strategy seems a better way in selection of weak keys and 
allows revealing the secret keys in less than 10 seconds with an average of a half million of packets. 
 
Based on previous results, we can conclude that the key security of protocols based on RC4 algorithm merely 
prevents arbitrary vulnerabilities but not against malicious attackers; the Initialization Vectors IV seems to be the 
weakest link in the security process.  Protocols based AES algorithm are more robust against attacks but appear 
much costly to deploy on active networks due to their encryption scheme (CCMP) which requires changes on 
hardware equipment. 
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